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INTRODUCTION 
It is a truism, but one which is too often forgotten, that 
decision processes in general, and regulatory decision making in 
particular, vary greatly according to subject matter (e.g., the 
activity, process, or substance to be regulated), cognitive 
philosophy, ideological stance, available knowledge and skills, 
institutional setting, and so on. As Philip Selznick has observed 
in a different context, "[dlecision-making is one of those fashion- 
able phrases that may well obscure more than it illuminates ... 
The general features of all choices, or of all social choice, 
ray some day be convincingly stated. But it will still be neces- 
sary to distinguish the more and the less trivial; and, if there 
is any order in this phenomenon, to identify some kinds of de- 
cisions, linking them to the distinctive problems or situations 
out of which they arise. 11 1 
As Selznick suggests, there may be too much variety in social 
choices to justify a single analytic approach or a single criterion 
of rationality. Yet, the tendency still prevailing in policy 
analysis is to force all kinds of decision problems into the 
Procrustean bed of "comprehensive rational analysis". The same 
stereotyped categories, the same models, the same evaluative 
criteria are applied to regulatory decisions regardless of specific 
differences and special circumstances. 
Even conceding that some economy of thought may have been 
achieved, the cost in terms of understanding the standard-setting 
process in all its complexity has been, I suspect, too high. 
For example, differences in biological philosophy, conflicting 
* 
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v iews  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  d e g r e e  t o  which t h e  human body c a n  overcome 
t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  t o x i c  a g e n t s  and p o l l u t a n t s ,  u n c e r t a i n t y  a b o u t  dose -  
r e s p o n s e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  o r  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o n t e x t  i n  which 
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  i n s p e c t o r s  o p e r a t e ,  h a r d l y  p l a y  any  r o l e  i n  most 
p o l i c y  a n a l y s e s  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e g u l a t i o n .  
However, s u c h  f a c t o r s  have  an  enormous i n f l u e n c e  on t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  
p r o c e s s .  D i f f e r e n c e s  i n  b i o l o g i c a l  p h i l o s o p h y ,  f o r  example ,  a r e  
t h e  main r e a s o n  f o r  t h e  s t r i k i n g  d i f f e r e n c e s  be tween many S o v i e t  
and Western  h e a l t h  s t a n d a r d s .  2 
An o v e r s i m p l i f i e d  v iew o f  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p roblem a l s o  
p e r v a d e s  most  c u r r e n t  d e b a t e s  on  t h e  c h o i c e  o f  r e g u l a t o r y  t o o l s .  
I t  i s  one  t h i n g  t o  show t h a t  unde r  c e r t a i n  i d e a l i z e d  c o n d i t i o n s  
p o l l u t i o n  t a x e s  a r e  t h e  most  e f f i c i e n t  (hence  " r a t i o n a l " ! )  p o l i c y  
i n s t r u m e n t s .  I t  i s  q u i t e  a n o t h e r  t h i n g  t o  a r g u e  t h a t  s u c h  t a x e s  
s h o u l d  be u s e d  i n  p r a c t i c e ,  i n  s p i t e  o f  i n a d e q u a t e  s c i e n t i f i c  
and economic d a t a ,  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  p rob lems ,  and t h e  g e n e r a l  
r e l u c t a n c e  o f  l e g i s l a t o r s ,  a d m i n i s t r a t . o r s ,  and t h e  p u b l i c  t o  
f o l l o w  t h e  e c o n o m i s t s '  a d v i c e  and a c c e p t  economic e f f i c i e n c y  a s  
t h e  b a s i c  c r i t e r i o n  o f  s o c i a l  c h o i c e .  
The a n a l y s t  who e v a l u a t e s  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p o l i c i e s  by t h e  s o l e  
c r i t e r i o n  o f  economic e f f i c i e n c y  a c t u a l l y  h a s  someth ing  i n  common 
w i t h  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t  who a d v o c a t e s  r e q u l . a t i o n  b a s e d  e x c l u s i v e l y  
on h e a l t h  c r i t e r i a .  F o r  b o t h  o f  them, t h e  i m p o r t a n t  t h i n g  i s  
outcome,  n o t  p r o c e s s ;  b o t h  a r e  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  t h a t  
a r e  made, n o t  how t h e y  a r e  made. 
E v a l u a t i n g  s o c i a l  c h o i c e s  by t h e i r  outcomes h a s  a  s t r o n g  
i n t u i t i v e  a p p e a l ,  b u t  p r e s u p p o s e s  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  some unambiguous 
measure  o f  outcome. When t h e  c o r r e c t n e s s  o r  f a i r n e s s  o f  t h e  o u t -  
come c a n  be d e t e r m i n e d  unambiguous ly ,  t h e  manner i n  which t h e  
d e c i s i o n  i s  t a k e n  i s  l a r g e l y  i m m a t e r i a l  -- o n l y  r e s u l t s  c o u n t .  
But  when t h e  f a c t u a l  and  v a l u e  p r e m i s e s  a r e  d e b a t a b l e ,  t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  
h i g h l y  u n c e r t a i n ,  when t h e r e  i s  no c o n s e n s u s  on e v a l u a t i v e  
c r i t e r i a - - t h e n  t h e  p r o c e s s  o r  p r o c e d u r e  o f  d e c i s i o n  making a c -  
q u i r e s  s p e c i a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  T h i s ,  a s  N i k l a s  Luhmann h a s  shown, 
i s  t h e  fundamen ta l  i n s i g h t  on which t h e  c l a s s i c a l  t h e o r i e s  o f  j u d i c i a l ,  
l e g i s l a t i v e ,  and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  p r o c e d u r e s  a r e  b a s e d .  
Regulators have traditionally sought legitimacy for their 
decisions by wrapping them in a cloak of scientific respectability. 
Their determinations (they claim) are firmly based on scientific 
analyses made by qualified experts. But the cognitive and in- 
stitutional complexity of pollution control and risk evaluation 
has dispelled the initial faith in the power of such experts. As 
this paper attempts to show, the scientific and conceptual basis 
of environmental regulation is so precarious, the empirical 
evidence so ambiguous, that most regulatory decisions can only 
be evaluated and legitimated in terms .of procedural, rather than 
substantive, rationality -- by process, not by outcome. 
THE CONCFPTUAI B A S 1  S OF REGUl A T I O N  
Environmental and health standards are derived, and used, 
differently in different countries. A major source of variations 
lies in differences in the definition of what is a state of health, 
and conflicting views concerning the degree to which the defense 
mechanisms of the body can be safely drawn upon to offset the 
effects of toxic agents and pollutants. 
Toxicological procedures used in the West rely on the idea I 
I 
I 
that no threat to health exists so long as the exposure does not I 
induce a disturbance that overloads the normal protective I 
mechanisms of the body. On the other hand, Soviet toxicologists main- ~ 
I 
tain that any change in the normal response to a stimulus represents an 
unacceptable deviation from normal conditions, and any concentra- 
tion, however small, places an undesirable toxic or nuisance stress i 
on the organism. Thus, a potential for ill-health is assumed to 
exist as soon as the organism undergoes the first detectable 
change of whatever kind from its normal state. 3 
To better visualize these conceptual differences, imagine 
the familiar dose-response curve (for example, curve A in Figure 1 
below) as being subdivided into three zones: an upper zone cor- 
responding to high doses of a toxic substance, where ill-effects 
due to exposure are clearly detectable; a compensatory zone where 
the body adjusts to the stresses imposed by lower levels of ex- 
posure, but at some cost; and, finally, a lower, homeostatic zone 
where the adjustments are automatic. 
According to the biological philosophy prevailing in the 
West, the defense mechanisms in the compensatory zone, as well 
as the normal adaptive processes in the homeostatic zone, can 
be safely drawn upon, within limits, to offset the levels of 
stress imposed by minimum exposure to hazardous agents at the 
workplace and in the environment, just as they are called upon 
to counter the wear and tear of ordinary life. Hence, dose- 
response relationships are extrapolated downward from the zone 
of demonstrable health burdens to a point of "non-detectable" 
ill effects. 4 
Soviet toxicologists start at the other end of the dose- 
response curve, moving upwards from zero dose and a corresponding 
initial benchmark of normality in the test organism. The per- 
missible level of exposure is established below the lowest dose 
needed to induce a statistically significant difference from the 
normal state, as revealed by highly sensitive measures of behavioral 
response. The assumption underlying this procedure is that the 
protective mechanisms in both homeostatic and compensatory zones 
should be kept in reserve to ward off unexpected toxic effectst 
and their effectiveness should not be weakened by the continuous 
demands of stress knowingly permitted in the environment or at 
the workplace. 
Neither the Soviet nor the western position can be dismissed 
as being unreasonable or contrary to known biological laws, but 
the practical implications in terms of acceptable levels of 
exposure are vastly different in the two cases. The official 
goal of Soviet standard-setters is a zero level of exposure. 
By contrast, goals of zero exposure have not been seriously dis- 
cussed in the United States or in other countries in the West, 
except for radiation protection and for carcinogens in the work- 
place. 5 
Conceptual differences concerning the nature of health and 
the adaptive capacity of the human organism are magnified by 
differences in research techniques. Soviet toxicologists place 
major emphasis on studying the effects of toxic agents on the 
nervous system. Central nervous system sensitivity (conditioned 
reflexes, electroencephalogramc) and reflex responses (changes in 
heart and respiratory rates, in blood pressure, and so on) play 
a central role in standard-setting. In the words of a Soviet 
expert 
We attach great significance to chronic changes 
in the higher nervous activity of animals under 
the influence of toxic substances in the air they 
breathe. We believe that changes in the func- 
tioning of the cortex of the cerebral hemispheres 
occur very early, even with small concentrations, 
since the cerebral cortex is highly sensitive to 
the effects of external factors in the environment ... 
One of the early manifestations of the influence 
of various chemical substances on the higher nervous 
system is the development of phasic states. Later, 
disinhibition of differentiation occurs, then 
individual reflexes begin to disappear and finally 
none of the reflex pattern is left. When the 
animal is more severely affected, the natural con- 
ditioned reflex to the sight and smell of food dis- 
appears. 6 
Because of this preoccupation with the role of the higher 
nervous system as controller of all bodily activity, considerably 
more importance is given to the pathology of this system than 
is the case in Western studies.' Incidentally, the interest of 
Soviet toxicologists in the nervous system and reflex be- 
havior can be explained by the enormous influence of Pavlovian 
theories on all domains of Soviet medicine.8 In particular, 
the insistence on testing the nervous system is justified by reference 
to Pavlov's theory that living organisms adapt to their environ- 
ment by means of two nervous mechanisms: the unconditioned re- 
flexes for the permanent features of the environment, and the 
conditioned reflexes for the temporary (conditional) features. 
American and European scientists, while not fully convinced 
that tests of the nervous system necessarily provide more sensitive 
indicators of toxic action, agree that sophisticated measurements 
of nervous-system effects should be a more important part of 
toxicological testing in the West. 9 
Another interesting methodological difference is the limited 
role which epidemiology seems to play in standard setting in the 
Soviet Union. In the West, and particularly in the United States, 
ep idemio logy  h a s  h i s t o r i c a l l y  p r o v i d e d  i m p o r t a n t ,  and sometimes 
d e c i s i v e ,  e v i d e n c e  on  which s t a n d a r d s  have  been  b a s e d ,  a l t h o u g h  
t h e r e  are i n d i c a t i o n s  t h a t  i t s  r o l e  may b e  d e c r e a s i n g  r e l a t i v e  
t o  t o x i c o l o g i c a l  t e s t i n g .  For  t h e  S o v i e t s ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand ,  
e p i d e m i o l o g i c a l  s t u d i e s  r e p r e s e n t  a  form o f  human e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n  
i n  which p r i o r  t o x i c o l o g i c a l  tes ts  and s u b s e q u e n t  p r e v e n t i o n  
have  f a i l e d .  I n  s h o r t ,  e p i d e m i o l o g i c a l  s t u d i e s  r e p r e s e n t  a  
r e a c t i v e  r a t h e r  t h a n  a p r e v e n t a t i v e  approach .  Ploreover ,  ep idemi-  
o l o g i c a l  s t u d i e s  a b r o a d ,  showing t h e  e f f e c t s  on h e a l t h  o f  concen-  
t r a t i o n s  h i g h e r  t h a n  t h o s e  a l l o w e d  i n  t h e  S o v i e t  v n i o n ,  e n c o u r a g e  
c o n t i n u e d  f a i t h  i n  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  t o x i c o l o g i c a l  
a p p r o a c h  t h a t  h a s  l e d  t o  t h e  lower  S o v i e t  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s .  1 0  
SCIFNTI F I C  UIVCFRTAINTY I N  STANDARD-SFTTI NG 
E x t r a p o l a t i o n  i s  a key s t e p  i n  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  e n v i r o n -  
m e n t a l  and h e a l t h  s t a n d a r d s ,  and a  good p a r t  o f  t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  
i n h e r e n t  i n  s t a n d a r d  s e t t i n g  o r i g i n a t e s  i n  v a r i o u s  t y p e s  o f  
e x t r a p o l a t i o n  p r o c e s s e s .  C o n s i d e r ,  f i r s t ,  t h e  problem o f  e x t r a -  
p o l a t i n g  from a n i m a l  e x p e r i m e n t s .  
A m a j o r  i s s u e  i n  t o x i c o l o g y  i s  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  
a n i m a l  s p e c i e s  t h a t  b e s t  p r e d i c t s  t h e  r e s p o n s e  of  man. Would 
t h e  same s p e c i e s  be  e q u a l l y  p r e d i c t i v e  f o r  a l l  p o l l u t a n t s  b e i n g  
t e s t e d ?  Do s p e c i e s  d i f f e r  i n  t h e  d e g r e e  t o  ,which t h e y  can  p r e d i c t  
t o x i c i t y  f o r  s p e c i f i c  o r g a n  sys t ems  -- k i d n e y ,  l i v e r ,  l u n g s ,  
and  s o  on? Which " a n i m a l  model" b e s t  s i m u l a t e s  t h e  p r e g n a n t  
woman, t h e  new-born c h i l d ,  o r  i n d i v i d u a l s  w i t h  i n a d e q u a t e  d i e t  o r  
g e n e t i c  d e f i c i e n c i e s ?  
The re  a r e  no u n e q u i v o c a l  answers  t o  s u c h  q u e s t i o n s .  Thus,  
many r e s e a r c h e r s  have  c r i t i c i z e d  t h e  e x c e s s i v e  u s e  o f  r o d e n t s  
a s  p r e d i c t i v e  models  b e c a u s e  r o d e n t s  are p h y l o g e n e t i c a l l y  f u r t h e r  
removed from humans t h a n  o t h e r  s p e c i e s ,  s u c h  a s  t h e  dog  o r  t h e  
monkey. However, a  s c i e n t i f i c  p a n e l  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  Food 
and Drug A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  on c a r c i n o g e n e s i s  h a s  n o t  recommended 
t h e  g e n e r a l  u s e  o f  t h e  dog i n  t h e  t e s t i n g  of c h e m i c a l  c a r c i n o -  
g e n e s i s  b e c a u s e  o f  i t s  l a r g e  s i z e  and r e l a t i v e l y  l o n g  l i f e - s p a n .  1 1  
There is, in fact, little hope that one species could 
provide the broad range of predictive potential needed to assess 
the responses of a highly heterogeneous human population to 
different types of pollutants. Predictions could be improved 
by using multiple species in toxicological experiments. But 
heterogeneity in human populations is often social in origin, 
and social conditions cannot be reproduced in the toxicologist's 
laboratory. 
The issue of human heterogeneity also arises in connection 
with the prediction of adverse health effects on individuals who 
are (or may be) at high risk with respect to certain pollutants. 
Once the toxic dose for the "normal healthy" population has been de- 
rived, consideration must be given to high-risk groups, i.e., "those 
individuals who experience toxic and/or carcinogenic effects 
significantly before the general population as a result of one 
or more biological factors, including developmental influences, 
genetic factors, nutritional inadequacies, disease conditions, 
and behavioral or life style characteristics. " I 2  Thus, children 
and adults with vitamin C deficiency are hypersensitive to 
ozone and to a number of heavy metals; pregnant women, to lead 
and carbon monoxide; people with asthmatic and chronic respiratory 
diseases, to respiratory irritants such as nitrogen dioxide, 
ozone, and sulfur dioxide. 
Standards developed for statistically "normal" individuals 
should be adjusted (by downward extrapolation or some other 
means) in order to protect the sections of the population at high 
risk. Unfortunately, high-risk groups are seldom considered 
specifically and separately in setting environmental and health 
standards, except perhaps through the dubious device of "safety 
factors" (see below). There are several reasons for this neglect; 
for example, lack of detailed exposure information, and the wide- 
spread assumption that high-risk groups represent a negligible 
percentage of the population. But recent research indicates that 
the number of high-risk individuals is quite large in some cases, 
and can include significant percentages of the population of 
specific racial ancestries. 1 3  
Strictly speaking, each individual has a unique genetic 
composition and life history, and thus a unique response to 
environmental pollutants. This heterogeneity of human populations 
leaves public authorities with an almost impossible regulatory 
task. In an effort to find a way out of this dilemma, toxico- 
logists and statisticians have developed several mathematical 
models expressing the probability of a lifetime response, P I  as 
a function of dosage D: P = f(D). This is the dose-response 
function; different models are obtained, with different choices 
of f. 
Observed 
exposure Ipvels 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
4 Dose- - 
Figure 1: Downward extrapolation with different dose- 
response functions 
Source: E.J. Calabrese, 
Deriving Environmental and Occupational 
Health Standards, Wiley-Interscience, 1978, 131. 
Figure 1 shows three choices of the extrapolating function from 
the nany possible options. Although all three choices are consistent 
with the data points obtained at high dose levels, their policy 
implications are quite different. Curve A represents the tra- 
ditional threshold (nonlinear) dose-response model. Using A, 
it would be possible to establish a "virtually safe" level of 
exposure at dose 3, even though high doses produce adverse health 
effects. Curve B represents a linear (nonthreshold) dose- 
response relationship: adverse health effects occur at every 
level of pollutant exposure and there is no obvious point at 
which a reasonable standard could be set. Finally, the dose- 
response relationship expressed by curve C is linear at high 
and moderate doses, but at lower doses it indicates more serious 
health effects than the linear model would have predicted. 
More sophisticated models consider the distribution of 
responses to different dose levels over the experimental popu- 
lation. Then f(D) becomes the density of the probability dis- 
tribution of responses, and the proportion of the population that 
will respond to a dose level D~ is given by the cumulative 
function 
Thus P(0) = 0 (i.e., there is no spontaneous occurrence of the 
particular response) , and P (m)  = 1 (i.e., no immune group exists 
within the population; all members will respond to sufficiently 
high doses). 
A virtually safe dose (VSD) is now defined as a dose level 
D such that P(DO) < Po, where Po is some preassigned small 0 - 
probability such as lod8 (the value favored by many toxicologists) 
or 1 0-6 (the value used, for example, by the U. S . Food and Drug 
Administration). The VSD can be computed as soon as f is known. 
But this is precisely the problem: how do we determine f? 
The usual procedure consists in fitting a curve (by one of many 
available methods) to the observations in the observable range, 
and then extraoolating downward to the unobservable response Po to 
determine the VSD. 
There are three major problems with this procedure. First, 
the choice of function has a major effect on the value of the 
VSD -- more than 100,000-fold according to the Advisory Committee 
on Safety Evaluation of the Food and Drug Administration. Second, 
the different extrapolating functions often cannot be distinguished 
from each other in the range of the observable responses. Fin- 
ally, no firm scientific basis now exists for choosing among 
the different possibilities. l 4  An additional problem with 
downward extrapolation (an empirical rather than a mathematical 
problem) is that high-dose exposure to pollutants may totally 
swamp many protective mechanisms of the body that function at 
low-level exposures. 
Why, it may be asked, are test animals exposed to levels 
of toxic substances far in excess of those to which humans would be 
exposed under normal circumstances -- thus making downward 
extrapolation necessary? This is done in order to compensate 
for the small samples of animals usually tested. 
For example, if we assume that a chemical agent will cause 
cancer in 1 out of 10,000 people who are exposed to it, and 
that humans and test animals do not differ significantly in 
sensitivity with respect to the given agent, it would be neces- 
sary to test at least 10,000 animals (but preferably something 
like 30,000 animals) in order to detect one case of cancer. 
With 1000 test animals and an unacceptably low confidence 
levei of 90%, the upper confidence limit for a negative ex- 
periment (no cancer induced at the given dose level) is 2.3 
cancers per 1000 tests. "No one could wish to introduce an agent 
into a human population for which no more could be said than 
that it would probably produce no more than 2 tumors per 1000. 
To reduce the upper limit of risk to 2 tumors per one million 
with confidence coefficient 0.999 would require a negative 
result in somewhat more than three million test animals. ,, 1 5 
In practice, no more than 50 or so animals are usually 
available per dose level; hence the use of high doses on small 
samples of animals. To reduce the experimental doses, and thus 
the unreliability of extrapolations outside the experimental 
range, one could think of conducting experiments with extremely 
large numbers of animals. Such "megamouse" experiments have 
i n  f a c t  b2en p roposed ;  b u t  t h e  c o s t s  would be  p r o h i b i t i v e ,  and 
t h e  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n s  s t i l l  d o u b t f u l  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  
problems connec ted  w i t h  human h e t e r o g e n e i t y  and e x t r a p o l a t i o n s  
from animal  t es t s .  
Unable t o  f i n d  c l e a n  t h e o r e t i c a l  s o l u t i o n s ,  s t a n d a r d - s e t t e r s  
d e a l  w i t h  t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  o f  t o x i c o l o g i c a l  p r e d i c t i o n s  by means 
o f  v a r i o u s  r u l e s  of  thumb -- s a f e t y  f a c t o r s ,  f o r  example. O f t e n  
a  s a f e t y  f a c t o r  o f  100 i s  u s e d ,  meaning t h a t  t e s t  a n i m a l s  s h o u l d  
show no a d v e r s e  h e a l t h  e f f e c t s  from a  g i v e n  p o l l u t a n t  when exposed 
t o  d o s e s  a t  l e a s t  100 t i m e s  g r e a t e r  t h a n  t h e  l i k e l y  human d o s e .  
T h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  r u l e  o f  thumb i s  sometimes j u s t i f i e d  by t h e  
r e a s o n i n g  t h a t  man may be  t e n  t i m e s  more s e n s i t i v e  t h a n  t h e  ex- 
p e r i m e n t a l  a n i m a l s  u s e d ,  and t h a t  t h e r e  may be  i n  a d d i t i o n  a  
t e n f o l d  v a r i a t i o n  i n  s e n s i t i v i t y  among i n d i v i d u a l s .  
T h i s  i s  a l l  r a t h e r  s p e c u l a t i v e  and ,  b e s i d e s ,  how d o e s  one  
j u s t i f y  t h e  s a f e t y  f a c t o r s  o f  50 o r  500 which a r e  a l s o  i n  u s e ?  
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I t  may be a r g u e d  t h a t  i f  t h e r e  i s  no f i r m  s c i e n t i f i c  b a s i s  
f o r  choos ing  among t h e  d i f f e r e n t  m a t h e m a t i c a l  models ,  t h e n  one 
s h o u l d  p r e f e r  t h e  s a f e s t  o r  most c o n s e r v a t i v e  p r o c e d u r e .  One 
problem w i t h  t h e  c o n s e r v a t i s m  argument i s  t h a t  it i s  n o t  c l e a r  
where one s h o u l d  s t o p .  l 6  A n o - t h r e s h o l d  model i s  more conse rva -  
t i v e  t h a n  one t h a t  a d m i t s  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h r e s h o l d s  f o r  c a r c i n o -  
g e n i c  e f f e c t s .  But  w i t h i n  t h e  l a r g e  c l a s s  o f  n o - t h r e s h o l d  models  
many d e g r e e s  o f  c o n s e r v a t i s m  a r e  p o s s i b l e .  Again,  i n  d e s i g n i n g  
a  t o x i c o l o g i c a l  e x p e r i m e n t  one c o u l d  u s e  t h e  most s e n s i t i v e  
s p e c i e s ,  t h e  most s e n s i t i v e  s t r a i n  w i t h i n  s p e c i e s ,  and s o  on down 
t o  t h e  l e v e l  o f  t h e  most  s e n s i t i v e  i n d i v i d u a l  a n i m a l ,  t h u s  ob- 
t a i n i n g  1Q0 p e r c e n t  i n c i d e n c e  a t  e a c h  d o s e  l e v e l .  I n  s h o r t ,  it 
i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  be  c o n s e r v a t i v e  i n  a  c o n s i s t e n t  manner,  u n l e s s  
one i s  p r e p a r e d  t o  p r o p o s e  a  z e r o  l e v e l  o f  e x p o s u r e  i n  e a c h  c a s e .  
A s  a  d e c i s i o n  r u l e ,  c o n s e r v a t i s m  i n  t h e  f a c e  o f  r i s k  i s  a s  
u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  a s  t h e  minimax o r  t h e  "most l i k e l y  e v e n t "  p r i n -  
c i p l e s ,  o r  indeed  any p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  d o e s  n o t  b a l a n c e  e x p e c t e d  
r i s k s  a g a i n s t  e x p e c t e d  b e n e f i t s .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  t h e  o n l y  
c o n s i s t e n t  ( B a y e s i a n )  d e c i s i o n  p r o c e d u r e  r e q u i r e s  i n f o r m a t i o n  
-- p r i o r  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  o f  a l l  p o s s i b l e  s c i e n t i f i c  hypo- 
t h e s e s ,  u t i l i t i e s  f o r  a l l  p o s s i b l e  consequences  -- which  no 
r e g u l a t o r  i s  l i k e l y  t o  s u p p l y .  
What a b o u t  d e t e r m i n i n g  a c c e p t a b l e  l e v e l s  o f  e x p o s u r e  on t h e  
b a s i s  of  a  c o s t - b e n e f i t  o r  r i s k - b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s ?  T h e r e  a r e ,  
o f  c o u r s e ,  well-known d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  q u a n t i f y i n g  b e n e f i t s ,  c o s t s ,  
and r i s k s .  The d a n g e r  t h a t  t h e  e s t i m a t e s  r e p r e s e n t  l i t t l e  more 
t h a n  d i s g u i s e d  v a l u e  judgments  i s  a lways  p r e s e n t .  Problems o f  
q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  a s i d e ,  a  number o f  r a t h e r  s t r i n g e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  
must  be  s a t i s f i e d  b e f o r e  t h e  c o s t - b e n e f i t  c r i t e r i o n  may b e  
m e a n i n g f u l l y  used  a s  a  d e c i s i o n  r u l e  i n  h e a l t h  r e g u l a t i o n .  
F i r s t ,  it h a s  l o n g  been  r e c o g n i z e d  t h a t  c o s t - b e n e f i t  a n a l -  
y s i s  i s  n o t  a p p l i c a b l e  unde r  ex t r eme  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  f o r  example ,  
when p o t e n t i a l  h e a l t h  damage i s  s o  l a r g e  t h a t  m a r g i n a l  t r a d e o f f s  
between t h e  r i s k s  and t h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  c e r t a i n  k i n d s  o f  a c t i v i t y  
become v i r t u a l l y  m e a n i n g l e s s .  A l s o ,  p r i c e - b a s e d  m a r g i n a l  c a l c u -  
l a t i o n s  ( and  t h e  t s t o n n e m e n t  p r o c e d u r e s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  d i s c o v e r  a  
c o r r e c t  set o f  p r i c e s )  a r e  h a r d l y  a p p r o p r i a t e  when immedia te  
a c t i o n  i s  r e q u i r e d .  To u s e  M a r t i n  Wei tzman ' s  example ,  suppose  
t h a t  a  c e r t a i n  number o f  a i r p l a n e s  i s  r e q u i r e d  f o r  a n  emergency 
o p e r a t i o n .  I n  s t r i c t  economic t e r m s ,  it would be  i n e f f i c i e n t  
t o  i s s u e  o r d e r s  t o  d i f f e r e n t  commercial  a i r l i n e s  t o  s u p p l y  a  g i v e n  
number o f  a i r p l a n e s ,  s i n c e  m a r g i n a l  o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t s  w i l l  t y p i c -  
a l l y  v a r y  from company t o  company. Y e t ,  i n  p r a c t i c a l  t e r m s ,  t h i s  
a p p r o a c h  would be  p r e f e r a b l e  t o  t h e  e c o n o m i c a l l y  c o r r e c t  p ro-  
c e d u r e  o f  announcing  a  p r i c e  f o r  p l a n e  s e r v i c e s  and l e t t i n g  p r o f i t -  
maximizing companies  d e c i d e  on t h e  number o f  p l a n e s  t h e y  would 
be w i l l i n g  t o  commit t o  t h e  r e s c u e  o p e r a t i o n .  1 7  
A t h i r d  c a s e  i n  which t h e  r e l e v a n c e  o f  t h e  a p p r o a c h  i s  
d o u b t f u l  i s  when t h e  b i o l o g i c a l  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  t o x i c a n t  t o  be  
r e g u l a t e d  becomes e v i d e n t  o n l y  a f t e r  a  l o n g  t i m e  ( p e r h a p s  2 0  t o  
3 0  y e a r s ) .  I f  p e o p l e  a r e  unaware o f  s u c h  long- run  e f f e c t s ,  no 
e x t e r n a l i t i e s  a r e  g e n e r a t e d  and t h e  c o s t - b e n e f i t  c r i t e r i o n  would 
i n d i c a t e  a  s t a t u s  quo p o l i c y  -- a  s o l u t i o n  which most  t o x i c o l o -  
g i s t s  ~ rou l r ?  c n n s i d e r  i r r e s p o n s i b l e .  ? lo reove r ,  p o l l u t a n t s  
s u c h  a s  cadmium, mercu ry ,  o r  r a d i o a c t i v e  w a s t e s ,  which d e t e r i o r a t e  
v e r y  s l o w l y  o v e r  t i m e ,  p o s e  p a r t i c u l a r  p rob lems ,  s i n c e  t h e  damage 
t h e y  c a u s e  a r i s e s  m o s t l y  from an  i r r e d u c i b l e  s t o c k ,  w h i l e  o n l y  
i n c r e m e n t a l  damage i s  c a u s e d  by t h e  f l o w  o f  p o l l u t i o n .  NOW, it 
i s  a  b a s i c  a s s u m p t i o n  o f  t h e  m a r g i n a l  c a l c u l u s  t h a t  t h e  r e l e v a n t  
v a r i a b l e s  c a n  b e  c o n t r o l l e d  i n  a l l  d i r e c t i o n s .  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  
p e r s i s t e n t  p o l l u t a n t s  t h e  s t o c k  o f  p o l l u t i o n  i s ,  t o  a l l  p r a c t i c a l  
p u r p o s e s ,  i r r e d u c i b l e ,  s o  t h a t  an  e s s e n t i a l  f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  
c o s t - b e n e f i t  a p p r o a c h  i s  m i s s i n g  i n  t h i s  t o x i c o l o g i c a l l y  impor- 
t a n t  s i t u a t i o n .  
P e r h a p s  t h e  most  s e r i o u s  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  u s i n g  c o s t - b e n e f i t  
c r i t e r i a  i n  s t a n d a r d  s e t t i n g  a r i s e  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  dynamic 
a s p e c t s  o f  p o l l u t a n t  e x p o s u r e .  I t  c a n  b e  shown t h a t  i n  a  b i o -  
l o g i c a l l y  u n s t a b l e  s i t u a t i o n ,  a  s t a n d a r d  set  a t  t h e  p o i n t  where 
m a r g i n a l  n e t  b e n e f i t s  e q u a l  e x t e r n a l  c o s t s  -- c o r r e s p o n d i n g  t o  
a  "Pareto-opt imum" l e v e l  o f  p o l l u t i o n  -- may f a i l  t o  p r e v e n t  
c o n t i n u i n g  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  and e v e n t u a l  d e s t r u c t i o n  
o f  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  o r g a n i s m s  t o  cope  w i t h  t h e  p e r m i s s i b l e  l e v e l  
o f  p o l l u t i o n .  18 
A s i d e  from t h e  t e c h n i c a l  and c o n c e p t u a l  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  c o s t -  
b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s ,  a  key  i s s u e  o f  r e g u l a t o r y  p h i l o s o p h y  i s  t h e  
r o l e  t h a t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o t h e r  t h a n  h e a l t h  and t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t  s h o u l d  
p l a y  i n  t h e  s t a n d a r d - s e t t i n g  p r o c e s s .  Debate  on t h i s  i s s u e  h a s  
been  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n t e n s e  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s t a n d  American 
l e g i s l a t i o n  shows q u i t e  c l e a r l y  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  r e a c h i n g  a  
c o n s e n s u s  on t h e  b a s i c  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  r e g u l a t i o n .  
Thus,  w h i l e  t h e  Tox ic  S u b s t a n c e s  C o n t r o l  A c t ,  t h e  F e d e r a l  
Env i ronmen ta l  P e s t i c i d e  C o n t r o l  A c t ,  t h e  S a f e  D r i n k i n g  Water A c t ,  
t h e  F e d e r a l  Food, Drug, and C o s m e t i c s  Act  ( w i t h  t h e  e x c e p t i o n  
o f  t h e  Food A d d i t i v e s  Amendment o f  1 9 5 8 ) ,  and t h e  O c c u p a t i o n a l  
S a f e t y  and H e a l t h  A c t  (OSH A c t )  c a l l  f o r  some b a l a n c i n g  of  c o s t s  
and b e n e f i t s ,  t h e  1970 C lean  A i r  A c t  Amendments, t h e  F e d e r a l  
Water P o l l u t i o n  C o n t r o l  A c t ,  and t h e  Resource  C o n s e r v a t i o n  and 
Recovery A c t  a r e  s i l e n t  on t h i s  i s s u e .  
Even when t h e  law r e q u i r e s  some b a l a n c i n g  o f  c o s t s  and 
b e n e f i t s ,  t h e  l a n g u a g e  i s  o f t e n  ambiguous.  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  
OSH Act, for example, the courts had to determine whether 
Section 6(b) (5) of the Act, which speaks only of feasibility 
("The Secretary ... shall set the standard which most adequately 
assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best avail- 
able evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment 
of health or functional capacity . . . " ) ,  permits OSHA to consider 
economic as well as technological factors in setting standards 
for toxic substances. 
Since Congress has set few coherent guidelines on the extent 
to which benefits, as well as costs and risks, must be considered, 
regulators have to rely on ad hoc procedures to somehow balance 
these incommensurable factors. A former director of the 
Office of Toxic Substances of the Environmental Protection Agency 
has described the process: 
Usually the procedure is to postulate a numerical 
standard for a toxic chemical or a specific type 
of limitation on the use of the chemical, with 
the restriction designed to reduce environmental 
levels to the point that concerns over health or 
environmental damage disappear. Then an assessment 
is carried out to see if the favorable environmental 
impact from the restriction warrants the concomitant 
economic costs. If the costs are too high, the 
level of control is adjusted until an appropriate 
balance is reached. 1 9  
It is interesting to compare this approach with the philo- 
sophy of Soviet regulators (and of many scientists in both East 
and West). 
Health standards, Soviet authorities maintain, should be 
based on health effects alone, without regard to the availability 
of adequate control technology, to economic feasibility, or even 
to the ability to adequately measure the concentrations in prac- 
tice. A currently unattainable standard can still represent a 
guideline for enforcement and an incentive for future research 
in control technology. Conversely, since technically or economi- 
cally attainable concentrations will coincide with harmless con- 
centrations only by chance, standards based on considerations of 
economic or technical feasibility "can act only as an obstacle 
t o  t h e  s e a r c h  f o r  b e t t e r  t e c h n i q u e s ,  ... t h e y  s a n c t i o n  what h a s  
a l r e a d y  been a c h i e v e d  w i t h o u t  s t i m u l a t i n g  new t e c h n i c a l  advances .  11 2  0 
S i n c e  " s c i e n t i f i c a l l y  based" s t a n d a r d s  c a n n o t  a lways  be  
a c h i e v e d ,  t h e  S o v i e t s  a l s o  u s e  secondary  ( " s a n i t a r y " )  s t a n d a r d s  
t h a t  may modify,  f o r  a  l i m i t e d  p e r i o d  of  t i m e ,  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  
set  by t h e  p r imary  ( " h y g i e n i c " )  s t a n d a r d s .  P r o f e s s o r  V.A.  Rjazanov,  
a  l e a d i n g  t o x i c o l o g i s t ,  d i s t i n g u i s h e s  between t h e  two t y p e s  of  s t a n -  
d a r d s  ( i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  a i r  p o l l u t i o n )  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t e r m s :  
Hygienic  s t a n d a r d s  ... must i n  themse lves  r e f l e c t  
t h e  s c i e n t i f i c a l l y  based i d e a l  towards  which w e  
must s t r i v e  i n  o r d e r  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  t h e  p u b l i c  i s  
n o t  s u b j e c t  t o  u n f a v o r a b l e  e f f e c t s  from a i r  p o l l u -  
t i o n .  T h i s  i d e a l  c a n n o t  be  ach ieved  a lways  and 
everywhere a t  a  g i v e n  t i m e .  T h e r e f o r e ,  a l o n g s i d e  
t h e  g e n e r a l  h y g i e n i c  s t a n d a r d s  f o r  maximum p e r -  
m i s s i b l e  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s ,  t h e r e  may be  s a n i t a r y  
s t a n d a r d s  o f  a  temporary  c h a r a c t e r ,  s e r v i n g  t h e  
needs  o f  t h e  moment. They may modify f o r  a  d e f i n e d  
p e r i o d  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  f o r  c l e a n l i n e s s  o f  t h e  ex- 
t e r n a l  a tmosphere ,  t a k i n g  i n t o  a c c o u n t  economic and 
t e c h n o l o g i c a l  f a c t o r s  ... Such a i r  p o l l u t i o n  
s t a n d a r d s  a r e  p e r m i s s i b l e  t e m p o r a r i l y ,  b u t  shou ld  
be  abandoned a f t e r  a  c e r t a i n  p e r i o d ,  d u r i n g  which 
t h e  c o n d i t i o n  o f  t h e  a i r  must be  b rough t  i n t o  con- 
f o r m i t y  w i t h  t h e .  h y g i e n i c  s t a n d a r d s .  I f  t h i s  
approach i s  a d o p t e d ,  h y g i e n i c  s t a n d a r d s  f o r  t h e  c l e a n l i -  
n e s s  o f  t h e  a tmosphere  w i l l  n o t  b e  used t o  s a n c t i o n  
e x i s t i n g  t e c h n i c a l  achievement ,  b u t  w i l l  r e p r e s e n t  
t h e  g o a l  towards  which w e  must s t r i v e . 2 1  
The cr i t ic ism t h a t  s t a n d a r d s  used i n  t h e  W e s t  t e n d  t o  c o d i f y  i 
I 
e x i s t i n g  economic and t e c h n i c a l  c o n d i t i o n s ,  t o  t h e  d e t r i m e n t  of  
~ 
t h e i r  normat ive  c h a r a c t e r ,  h a s  some v a l i d i t y .  I t  i s  o f t e n  s a i d  1 
I 
t h a t  one o f  t h e  main g o a l s  o f  env i ronmenta l  o r  h e a l t h  s t a n d a r d s  I I 
i s  t o  channe l  growth away from hazardous  i n d u s t r i e s  and m a t e r i a l s  I 
toward s a f e r  forms o f  p r o d u c t i o n  and employment. But it i s  hard  I 
t o  see how a  " f e a s i b l e "  s t a n d a r d  ( i n  t h e  s e n s e  i n  which t h i s  
~ 
t e r m  h a s  been r e c e n t l y  u s e d )  can p r o v i d e  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  s i g n a l s .  ~ 
C o n s i d e r ,  f o r  example, t h e  h i s t o r y  of  OSHA r e g u l a t i o n  of  t h e  
~ 
c a r c i n o g e n  v i n y l  c h l o r i d e  ( V C ) .  1 
I n  A p r i l  1974, OSHA promulqated an Emergency Temporary S tandard  (ETS) 
r e d u c i n g  t h e  p r e v i o u s  N a t i o n a l  Consensus S tandard  f o r  v i n y l c h l o r i d e  I 
from 500 p a r t s  p e r  m i l l i o n  (pprn) t o  50 ppm. The N a t i o n a l  Consensus ~ 
Standard of pre-OSHA times was a standard proposed by the American 
Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists, and voluntarily 
accepted by industry, at a time when it was unknown that VC could 
induce cancer. The statement of reasons supporting the ETS re- 
veals that the 50 ppm standard was an uneasy compromise between 
conflicting considerations and interests. 
During the summer of 1974, OSHA held intensive hearings on 
the proposal for a permanent standard of 1 ppm (as a time-weighted 
average over an 8-hour work period, with permissible excursions 
up to 5 ppm averaged over any 15-minute period). Although the 
disagreement on the medical evidence was considerable, most of 
the debate concerned the "feasibility" of the proposal. Industry 
opposed the proposed level of 1 ppm on the grounds that OSHA 
lacked sufficient evidence on the harmfulness of VC at low doses; 
that it was technologically impossible to meetthe 1 ppm ceiling; 
and that the cost of approaching the ceiling would force the 
companies out of business. Conceding industry's claims of 
infeasibility, OSHA finally promulgated a somewhat weakened 
permanent standard. 
Subsequent experience was to show that meeting the 1 ppm level 
was neither as difficult nor as costly as industry had predicted. 
The permanent VC standard lacks explicit criteria of feasibility, 
but a careful case study comes to the conclusion that "OSHA's 
statements and actions suggest that it was following an unartic- 
ulated principle that a standard is not feasible if it would 
cause more than slight changes in the number of firms in an 
industry, or in an industry's profit and growth rates, its output, 
and competitive position. I, 2 2  
The case of the vinyl chloride standard is far from being 
unique. American regulators are constantly urged to treat 
economic and technical feasibility as important considerations 
in the derivation of health and environmental standards. The 
result of these pressures has been an increasing confusion of 
the conceptually distinct stages of standard-setting and standard- 
using. The notion of aggregating scientific, technical, economic, 
and political data into a single value is appealing, but in 
practice it has led to logically inconsistent conclusions. 
The meaning of the numerical value chosen for a given standard 
becomes ambiguous, representing neither a policy goal, nor a 
scientific judgment of health risk, nor even (since the standards 
are supposed to be enforceable at the national level) a measure 
of the level of protection that can be reasonably achieved in 
specific local situations. Whatever reservations one might have 
about the logic of the distinction drawn by Soviet regulators 
between primary and secondary standards, it must be admitted 
that at least it allows a clear statement of objectives, while 
avoiding the danger of sanctioning existing technical and economic 
conditions. 
RE G U L h r O R Y  " -  REFORY: SOME S U G G E S T I W  
It is time to draw some conclusions from the preceding dis- 
cussion. Environmental qnd health standards are, and will long 
remain, basic instruments of regulatory policy. At the same 
time, the standard-setting process rests on precarious conceptual, 
scientific, and economic foundations. This contradiction 
poses almost insoluble problems of administrative 
rationality and legitimacy. For example, the demand for "con- 
clusive" scientific evidence or thorough risk analyses before a 
standard is adopted is more likely to delay public action than 
to improve the quality of decision-making, and to generate 
dissension rather than consensus. 
What is needed is a fundamental restructuring of procedures, 
institutions, and evaluative criteria along lines that explicitly 
recognize the uncertainty and complexity of regulatory decisions. 
Two directions of regulatory reform seem to be particularly 
important. First, statutory regulations should be replaced as 
much as possible by non-statutory codes and standards; in partic- 
ular, standard-setting should be clearly distinguished from 
standard-using. Although emphasis on compulsory standards 
is more characteristic of recent American legislation, pressure 
for statutory regulation is also building up in several 
European countries (in part as a result of the activities of 
environmentalist groups), and at the level of the European 
Community. 
Second, greater attention should be paid to the procedural 
aspects of standard-setting than has so far been the case. With 
the present state of knowledge, it is unrealistic to require that 
regulatory decisions be supported by "proof" in the strict sense 
of the word. But cognitive uncertainty, far from justifying 
carelessness in choosing among alternative data, theories, and 
methodologies, in fact demands strong procedural controls to make 
sure that the implications of these choices are explored from a 
variety of viewpoints, and to facilitate a detailed factual 
analysis of the intellectual merits of the conclusions. 
Concerning the first point -- the need for greater regulatory 
flexibility -- it is clear that environmental and health stan- 
dards should be revised as scientific knowledge improves, 
empirical evidence accumulates, and socioeconomic conditions 
change. However, frequent revisions are unlikely (or very 
costly) when standards are embedded in legal codes. Also, 
the more uncertain the scientific basis of regulation and the 
greater the need for flexibility and adaptability, the more 
discretion should be left to the regulatory agency. But statutory 
regulation sets narrow limits to administrative discretion. 
The experience of a number of European countries, partic- 
ularly in the area of occupational health, shows that an effective 
regulatory system can be operated without heavy reliance on 
legally enforceable standards. In the Federal Republic of 
Germany and in France, maximum acceptable concentrations (MACs) 
for toxic substances and other environmental limits are not em- 
bedded in legal codes but are used by the inspectors -- together 
with other information on the physical, chemical, and toxicological 
characteristics of different substances -- for giving preventive 
advice and monitoring working and environmental conditions. MAC 
values and numerical standards are typically based on health 
criteria only. Guidelines interpreting the standards in the 
light of technical and economic constraints are issued by separate 
governmental commissions, such as the German Committee for 
Dangerous Materials in the Workplace (Ausschuss far gefahrliche 
Arbeitsstoffe) set up by the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security. 
In the United Kingdom, too, occupational health standards 
have no specific legal status, but are used by the Factory 
Inspectorate of the Department of Emplopent for control and 
surveillance of working conditions. A strong case for greater 
reliance on voluntary standards and codes is presented in the 
official report of the Parliamentary Committee appointed in 
May 1970 under the chairmanship of Lord Robens. Although the 
report deals with occupational health and safety, many of its 
arguments have more wide-ranging validity. The following 
recommendations of the Robens Committee are particularly 
relevant to the present argument: 
- Wherever practicable, regulations should be confined 
to statements of the broad objectives to be achieved. 
- In future, no statutory regulation should be made before 
detailed consideration has been given to whether objectives might 
adequately be met by a non-statutory standard or code of practice. 
- Greater emphasis should he placed on standard-setting by 
means of non-statutory codes and standards. As a general rule, 
statutory regulations should only be made when the non-statutory 
alternatives have been fully explored and found wanting. 
- The whole regulatory system should be more flexible 
and more discriminating. Industry should be encouraged 
to deal with more of its own problems, thereby enabling official 
regulation to be more effectively concentrated on serious prob- 
lems where strict official regulation is appropriate and 
necessary. 2 3 
These recommendations express the belief that statutory 
regulations are largely ineffective, intrinsically rigid, and 
have a built-in tendency to become obsolete quite rapidly. On the 
other hand, "standards and codes developed within industry and 
by independent bodies are, over a large part of the field, more 
practical and therefore potentially more effective instruments 
of  p r o g r e s s  t h a n  s t a t u t o r y  r e g u l a t i o n s .  " 2 4  The Repor t  c o n c l u d e s  
t h a t  what i s  needed i s  " l e s s  law" and more p r o v i s i o n  f o r  v o l u n t a r y  
s e l f - r e g u l a t i o n  a t  t h e  p l a n t  l e v e l .  
However, i n  o r d e r  t o  p r o v i d e  c r e d i b l e  s a n c t i o n s  when needed,  
i n s p e c t o r s  shou ld  have t h e  power, w i t h o u t  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  c o u r t s ,  
t o  i s s u e  fo rmal  Improvement N o t i c e s ,  i . e . ,  o r d e r s  t o  comply n o t  
o n l y  w i t h  any r e l e v a n t  s t a t u t o r y  r e g u l a t i o n ,  b u t  a l s o  w i t h  any 
r e l e v a n t  v o l u n t a r y  code  o r  s t a n d a r d  t h a t  h a s  been f o r m a l l y  ap- 
proved by t h e  A u t h o r i t y  f o r  S a f e t y  and H e a l t h  a t  Work. Volun ta ry  
codes  and s t a n d a r d s  would a l s o  be  a d m i s s i b l e  e v i d e n c e  i n  pro-  
c e e d i n g s  b e f o r e  t r i b u n a l s  ( t h e  Repor t  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  a p p e a l s  
a g a i n s t  improvement n o t i c e s  should  be  h e a r d  n o t  i n  t h e  c r i m i n a l  
c o u r t s  b u t  by t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  t r i b u n a l s  se t  up under  t h e  1964 
I n d u s t r i a l  T r a i n i n g  A c t ) .  I n  c a s e s  where s e r i o u s  h a z a r d s  o r  
imminent d a n g e r s  e x i s t ,  t h e  i n s p e c t o r  c o u l d  i s s u e  a  P r o h i b i t i o n  
N o t i c e  o r d e r i n g  t h a t ,  i n  t h e  e v e n t  of  non-compliance w i t h i n  t h e  
s t a t e d  t i m e  l i m i t ,  t h e  u s e  o f  s p e c i f i e d  p l a n t ,  machinery ,  pro-  
c e s s e s  o r  p r e m i s e s  must be  d i s c o n t i n u e d ,  o r  c o n t i n u e d  o n l y  under 
s p e c i f i c  c o n d i t i o n s .  
But e n s u r i n g  compl iance  w i t h  minimum l e g a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  
i s  n o t  t h e  main t a s k  o f  t h e  i n s p e c t o r a t e .  R a t h e r ,  i n s p e c t o r s  
shou ld  be  concerned w i t h  t h e  broad a s p e c t s  of s a f e t y  and h e a l t h  
a t  t h e  workp laces  t h e y  v i s i t ,  a s  much a s  w i t h  t h o s e  
narrow a s p e c t s  which may have been t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  d e t a i l e d  
s t a t u t o r y  r e g u l a t i o n s .  "We b e l i e v e , "  t h e  Repor t  s t a t e s ,  " t h a t ,  
a s  a  m a t t e r  o f  e x p l i c i t  p o l i c y ,  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  o f  s k i l l e d  and 
i m p a r t i a l  a d v i c e  and a s s i s t a n c e  shou ld  be  t h e  l e a d i n g  edge  o f  
t h e  u n i f i e d  i n s p e c t o r a t e .  I! 25 
The second d i r e c t i o n  of reform i s  concerned w i t h  what 
H e r b e r t  Simon h a s  c a l l e d  " p r o c e d u r a l  r a t i o n a l i t y " .  I n  s i t u a t i o n s  
c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by g r e a t  u n c e r t a i n t y  and c o g n i t i v e  complex i ty ,  Simon 
a r g u e s ,  "we must g i v e  an  a c c o u n t  n o t  o n l y  o f  s u b s t a n t i v e  r a t i o n -  
a l i t y  -- t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which a p p r o p r i a t e  c o u r s e s  of  a c t i o n  a r e  
chosen -- b u t  a l s o  o f  p r o c e d u r a l  r a t i o n a l i t y  -- t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s ,  
i n  l i g h t  of  human c o g n i t i v e  powers and l i m i t a t i o n s ,  of  t h e  pro-  
-
c e d u r e s  used  t o  choose  a c t i o n s .  11 2 6  
Policy analysis has been traditionally concerned with the 
problem of choosing the best means to achieve given 
ends. The basic conceptual categories of the policy analyst -- 
goals, alternatives, impacts, effectiveness, choice -- clearly 
reveal his deep commitment to a teleological conception of policy 
making. According to this conception, rationality means maximizing 
something; it means choosing the best alternative, subject to a set 
of constraints. Hence the preoccupation with methods of analysis 
and evaluation that emphasize outcome rather than process, and 
the interest in what decisions are made, rather than in how they 
are made. As a result, policy analysis lacks the methodological 
equivalents of legal notions like reasoned decision, proper form, 
and rules of evidence. 
This indifference toward procedur~s a ~ d  the formal lsyout 
of arguments is justifiable under the assumption that there is 
"one best wa?" of making a decision or, if several methods are 
possible, that there is a well-defined rule for choosing among 
them. This is certainly not the situation in standard-setting. 
Here, Jerome Cornfield points out, "[all1 present safety evalu- 
ation procedures ... must be regarded as mathematical formalisms 
whose correspondence with the realities of low dose effects is, 
and may long remain, largely conjectural. "*' Thus, the most 
important problem is not determining the "correct" value for a 
certain standard -- is it 5 or 2 ppm? -- but which criteria and 
procedures should be used to choose among competing models, 
approaches, and regulatory philosophies. 
In other words, the main problem with many environr-ental policy 
decisions is not that they are, in some sense, suboptimal (we 
generally lack the scientific and medical knowledge to know what 
the correct decision should be), but that they leave much to 
be desired in terms of procedural rationality. Standard-setters 
often fail to probe deeply into the quality of the available 
evidence, or to test the sensitivity of the chosen model to 
uncertainty and alternative assumptions. Even more commonly, 
the methodology used in reasoning from the data to a proposed 
standard is so informal that it is impossible to retrace the 
steps of the agency's argument and its factual basis.. Again, 
the standard-setting process usually does not include any pro- 
cedures specifically designed to bring out unstated assumptions, 
differing interpretations, and gaps in logic or in the empirical 
evidence. 
An interesting example of procedural reform in the area 
of environmental regulation comes from the United States. Here 
the courts have recently developed "paper hearing" procedures that 
combine many of the advantages of a trial-type adversary process 
(without oral testimony and cross-examination), while avoiding 
undue costs and delays in decision-making. The procedural 
requirements imposed by the courts on the Environmental Protection 
Agency have been summarized by Pedersen: 2 8 
First, both the essential factual data on which 
the rule is based and the methodology used in 
reasoning from the data to the proposed standard 
must be disclosed for comment at the time a rule 
is proposed ... Second, the agency's discussion 
of the basis and purpose of its rule -- generally 
contained in the "preambles" to the notices of 
proposed and final rule-making and in the accom- 
panying technical support documents -- must detail 
the steps of the agency's reasoning and its factual 
basis. Third, significant comments received during 
the public comment period must be answered at the 
time of final promulgation. However, comments 
must meet a standard of detail equal to that re- 
quired of the agency in promulgating its rule 
before they will be considered significant. Fourth, 
only objections to the regulations which were 
raised with some specificity during the public 
comment period, and to which the agency thus had 
an opportunity to respond, may be raised during 
judicial review. 
Although these requirements are only a first step, and much 
remains to be done in reducing the ineffectiveness and 
rigidity of the present system and its built-in tendency to 
become obsolete, there is alreadv some evidence of 
improvement in the quality of environmental decision making. 
Data and technical studies are collected and organized more 
systematically; external criticism is explicitly taken into 
account so that policies reflect a broader range of considerations 
and interests; the various subunits of the regulatory agency are 
motivated to coordinate their assessments, methodologies, and 
conclusions. The new procedures should also increase the in- 
fluence of the people who, because of their special knowledge, 
are more directly involved in standard-setting. 
I would argue that the experience of the "paper hearing" 
procedures developed at EPA under the Clean Air Act has general 
relevance. The requirement of an open record that includes the 
factual and methodological bases of an agency's conclusions, as 
well as external criticism and responses to such criticism, is 
always a powerful incentive to more careful agency deliberations. 
The need to improve the intellectual quality of administrative 
deliberations is not, however, the only reason why procedural 
questions are so important today. In situations of great comnlexity 
and cognitive uncertainty it is essential that the groups affected 
should be willing to accept the outcome of the administrative 
process even before this has been determined. By ensuring 
adequate representation of conflicting opinions and examining 
a wide range of alternatives, well-designed procedures can 
greatly improve not only the rationality but also the legitimacy 
of regulatory decisions. 
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